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Recent state-wide smoking bans are likely the most significant regulations imposed 
on the casino gaming industry.  We explore the effects that the Illinois state 
smoking ban has had on Illinois casino revenue and attendance as well as casino 
tax revenue.  Our empirical methodology extends and enhances that of previous 
literature in that we observe a natural experiment in comparing the performance of 
Illinois casinos with out-of-state casinos (no smoking ban) that share a market with 
Illinois casinos.  Estimates suggest that revenue and admissions at Illinois casinos 
declined by more than 20 percent ($400 million) and 12 percent, respectively.  
Calculations reveal that casino tax revenue to state and local governments declined 
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     The Revenue Performance of Casinos after a Smoking Ban: 
                   The Case of Illinois 
 
Introduction 
  Over the past, decade a growing number of state and local governments have enacted 
laws that restrict or prohibit smoking in bars, restaurants, and other public places.  As of January 
2009, fifteen states and 774 city and county jurisdictions across the United States have enacted 
laws prohibiting smoking in bars, restaurants, and workplaces.  Of the local prohibitions against 
smoking, 593 require smoke-free workplaces and 594 require smoke-free restaurants.
1  
Proponents of smoking bans cite public health benefits, whereas opponents argue that revenue 
and employment losses may outweigh the health benefits from a smoking ban.  Research on the 
economic effects (revenue and employment) of smoking bans has revealed a negative effect for 
some businesses, although the magnitude of the smoking ban effect differs across studies.
2
  In addition to prohibiting smoking in bars and restaurants, many state and local 
governments have also enacted smoking bans in gaming establishments.  As of January 2009, 15 
states have enacted 100 percent smoke-free laws for state-regulated gaming.
    
3
                                                 
1 See American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation (2009a). 
  However, the 
extension of smoking prohibitions to commercial casinos is a new phenomenon.  Of the 12 states 
2 Recent studies include Phelps (2006), Adams and Cotti (2007), and Fleck and Hanssen (2008).  Phelps (2006) and 
Adams and Cotti (2007) used nationwide county-level employment data and examined the change in employment at 
bars and restaurants after communities adopted a smoking ban.  Neither study found significant employment 
changes at restaurants, on average, but both find statistically significant employment declines at bars, with loss 
estimates ranging from 4 percent to 16 percent.  Fleck and Hanssen (2008) analyzed quarterly restaurant sales data 
for 267 California cities over 25 years.  They find a statistically significant 4 percent decline in revenue that is 
attributed to smoking bans.  Other studies on the subject include Dunham and Marlow (2000a, 2000b, 2003), Glantz 
and Smith (1994), and Pakko (2008b).  Difficulties in estimating the effects of smoking bans and likely reasons for 
the divergent results across studies include differences in the type of ban (partial, full) across jurisdictions, the length 
of time each ban has been in place, the coverage of the data used in the analyses, and the size of the smoking 
population relative to the non-smoking population. 
3 See American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation (2009b).  Native American gaming exists in 29 states and is not 
subject to state and local smoking laws. 
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with commercial casino gaming, only Colorado and Illinois prohibit smoking in commercial 
casinos.
4
  For several reasons, the policy discussion on prohibiting smoking in casinos has received 
separate, and arguably sharper, debate than smoking bans in bars and restaurants.
  The smoke-free laws in those two states both took effect at the beginning of 2008. 
5  First, the 
marginal contribution of one or two casinos to local employment and tax revenue, most notably 
in the Midwest and South, is much greater than for a bar or restaurant; in many small 
communities, one or two casinos employ a large percentage of the population and also provide a 
large percentage of tax revenue to local communities.
6
  Research on the effects of a smoking ban on casino revenue has thus far focused on the 
state of Delaware, which implemented a smoke-free law in December 2002.
  Second, many state and local 
governments earmark casino revenue to specific programs such as infrastructure and education.  
Third, a casino smoking ban is likely to have a greater negative revenue impact on the gaming 
industry than a smoking ban would have on the restaurant industry because customers patronize 
casinos for longer time periods than they do restaurants.  Finally, the view by some that casino 
gaming is an immoral activity increases attention to any public policy affecting casino gaming.   
7
                                                 
4 See American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation (2009b).  Many commercial casinos designate a percentage of their 
floor space as non-smoking. 
   In the first study 
on the subject, Mandel, Alamar, and Glantz (2005) found that the smoking ban in Delaware had 
a negative but statistically insignificant effect on gaming revenue.  After correcting for errors in 
the Mandel, Alamar, and Glantz (2005) study, Pakko (2006) found that the smoking ban in 
Delaware casinos resulted in a loss of about $6 million, which represented a loss of over 12 
5 Points of debate have been summarized from transcripts from floor debate in the Illinois General Assembly prior to 
passage of the Smoke Free Illinois Act in July of 2007.  See 
http://www.ilga.gov/search/iga_search.asp?scope=sentran95 and search by keywords “smoking ban.” 
6  For example, contacts at the Casino Queen in East St. Louis, Illinois, report that the city of East St. Louis receives 
over half of its annual operating revenue from the casino. 
7 The three casinos in Delaware are not commercial casinos.  They operate as part of the Delaware State Lottery and 
represent “electronic gaming devices” (slot machines) located at racetracks throughout the state.  Casinos operating 
at racetracks are often called racinos. - 3 - 
 
percent relative to average monthly revenue in the year preceding the smoking ban.  In a 
subsequent study, Pakko (2008a) examined the effect of smoking bans on individual casino 
revenue in Delaware, finding that casino revenue declined significantly at each of the three 
Delaware casinos as a result of the smoking ban, with a total revenue effect of approximately 15 
percent.  Finally, Thalheimer and Ali (2008) estimate a system of slot machine demand equations 
for the three Delaware casinos.  They find that the smoking ban in Delaware reduced gaming 
demand by nearly 16 percent. 
  In this paper we extend the economic research on the effect of smoking bans on casino 
gaming revenue.  Our work has several advantages over previous studies on the subject.  First, 
the focus of our analysis is casino gaming in the state of Illinois, the first example of a smoking 
ban that applies to full-service commercial casinos.  Second, we use casino revenue data in 
adjacent states to help identify the effect of the smoking ban in Illinois and to examine whether 
there were any revenue spillover effects for casinos located within the same markets but not 
subject to the smoking ban.  This provides for a natural experiment in comparing the 
performance of Illinois casinos with out-of-state casinos (no smoking ban) that share a market 
with Illinois casinos.  Third, we explore the effect of the Illinois smoking ban on casino 
admissions as well as casino revenue to generate insight into any difference in the number of 
patrons versus intensity of casino wagering after the smoking ban.  Finally, we conduct several 
analyses using state-level data, market-level data, and individual casino-level data to assess the 
impact of the Illinois casino smoking ban on Illinois casinos as well as the casino markets in 
neighboring states that border Illinois.  Our results have implications for the casino industry and 
the state and local governments that receive a portion of their revenue from casino gaming taxes. 
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Background and Motivation 
  Riverboat gaming was legalized in Illinois in February 1990 with passage of the 
Riverboat Gambling Act, making Illinois the second state in the nation to legalize riverboat 
gambling.  There are currently nine riverboat casinos in Illinois, eight of which border 
neighboring states – two along the Mississippi River across from St. Louis, Missouri; one along 
the Mississippi River near Davenport, Iowa; one in southern Illinois on the Ohio River; and four 
along rivers in the Chicago area.
8  In 2007, Illinois casinos generated nearly $2 billion in 
adjusted gross receipts (AGR) and $685 million in casino tax revenue to the state government 
(all earmarked for education) and $120 million to the municipalities where the riverboats are 
located.
9
In July 2007, the state of Illinois passed the Smoke Free Illinois Act (SB0500, Public Act 
095-0017).
  The state of Illinois ranks 6
th in state-wide casino revenue generated, but has the fewest 
number of casinos of the top 6 states. 
10
  One contribution of our study is that we empirically estimate the effect of the Illinois 
smoking ban on the revenue of out-of-state casinos that border Illinois.  For our purposes, there 
are four distinct casino markets (based on geographic proximity) that each consist of casinos in 
both Illinois and the border state (see Figure 1).   Each market therefore has Illinois casinos 
directly affected by the smoking ban and out-of-state casinos that may have experienced revenue 
and visitation spillovers from the Illinois smoking ban.  The first market, which we term the 
  The Act prohibits smoking in public places, places of employment, and 
governmental vehicles.  During debate, numerous industries including the casino industry 
argued, eventually unsuccessfully, for an exemption from the state-wide smoking ban.   
                                                 
8 The ninth casino is in Peoria, which is located in central Illinois and thus faces no nearby out-of-state competitors. 
9 See the Illinois Gaming Board 2007 Annual Report (http://www.igb.state.il.us/annualreport/2007igb.pdf.)  
Adjusted gross revenues are defined as total wagers less player winnings. 
10 Full text of the Smoke Free Illinois Act as well as the voting history can be found at 
http://www.ilga.gov/search/iga_search.asp?scope=sentran95 and by searching with the keywords “smoking ban.” - 5 - 
 
“Chicago area market,” consists of four casinos along Chicago area rivers and four casino 
locations in northwestern Indiana.
11  Second, the “Southern” market includes one casino in the 
city of Metropolis Illinois, which faces competition from a casino in southern Missouri as well as 
one in southern Indiana.  The third market, the “Quad City market,” has one casino on the 
Illinois side of the Mississippi River and four nearby riverboat casinos on the Iowa side of the 
Mississippi River.
12  Finally, the “St. Louis market’ includes three casinos in Missouri and two 
casinos in Illinois that are all located within the St. Louis metropolitan area.
13
  The conceptual basis for the hypothesis that a smoking ban will have a negative effect on 
casino revenue (for those casinos in the smoking ban state) is straightforward:  Casino patrons 
who smoke will chose not to visit the now-smoke-free casino or will gamble less as a result of 
taking breaks from gambling to go outside the facility to smoke.  The effect of the smoking ban 
will depend on the size of these effects, and the size of each effect is a function of casino patron 
smoking rates.
  A listing of the 
Illinois casinos used in our analysis, along with descriptive statistics, is provided in Table 1.  
14
  One key factor in the potential revenue loss from a casino smoking ban is the percentage 
of gamblers who smoke.  Those in the casino industry argue that a smoking ban will unfairly hurt 
their industry because casino patrons have a higher smoking rate than that of the general 
  By examining both casino revenue and casino admissions, we provide insights 
into whether fewer patrons visited the Illinois casinos after the ban or whether wagering by the 
same number of patrons is less (thus suggesting no substitution with area casinos but rather less- 
intense wagering). 
                                                 
11 We treat the Majestic I and Majestic II—two casinos in Gary, Indiana, sharing a common admissions gate—as 
one casino location. 
12 The Quad Cities include Davenport (Iowa), Moline (Illinois), Rock Island (Illinois), and Bettendorf (Iowa). 
13 Data from the Lumiere Place casino, which opened in December 2007, is treated separately from those of the pre-
existing casinos in the St. Louis market.  
14 We assume that the smoking ban will not induce a significant number of people to begin gambling as a result of 
the ban. - 6 - 
 
population.  This premise is included in the work of Pritsos, Pritsos, and Spears (2008).  
However, these authors find evidence that the smoking rate (about 21 percent) in casinos located 
in Nevada (Las Vegas, Reno, and Lake Tahoe) is not statistically different from that of the 
general population.  It may be the case, however, that smoking casino patrons have higher 
gaming expenditures than non-smoking patrons.  Petry and Oncken (2002) conducted a survey of 
gamblers who smoke and those who do not and found that smokers gambled on more days and 
spent more money gambling than did non-smoking gamblers.  Thus, at a minimum, a casino 
smoking ban is likely to influence about 20 percent of all casino patrons and 20 percent of casino 
revenue if one assumes that the smoking rate for gamblers is the same as the general population 
and gamblers who smoke do not gamble more than non-smoking gamblers.
15
  One confounding issue with estimating the effects of the smoking ban is that the timing 
of the ban coincides with a general economic downturn.  The 2008 Annual Report of the Illinois 
Gaming Board reports uncertainty about the relative importance of the two effects: 
   
There are two factors underlying the reductions in this year’s gaming revenues. 
The first is the smoking ban implemented by the Smoke Free Illinois Act (Public 
Act 95-0017), effective January 1, 2008. According to the casino industry, 
implementation of this Act has caused the AGR [adjusted gross receipts] per 
admission to fall. This is because habitual smokers take smoking breaks, during 
which time they do not engage in gaming activity. The second factor is the 
downturn in the Illinois and national economies. As a discretionary form of 
spending, gaming expenditures are especially prone to reductions during hard 
economic times. The relative importance of the above two factors has not yet been 
quantified with certainty. 
 
-  2008 Annual Report, Illinois Gaming Board, p. 12 
 
                                                 
15 The adult smoking rates in 2007 for Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa were, respectively, 20.1 percent, 24.1 
percent, 24.5 percent, and 19.8 percent.  The U.S. smoking rate in 2007 was 19.3 percent.  Data from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention were compiled by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation.  See 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=80&cat=2. 
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Our objective in this paper is to statistically disentangle the factors underlying the decline 
in Illinois casino revenue.  We approach the issue by estimating multiple linear regression 
models for casinos in Illinois, as well as in the surrounding states that also have riverboat 
casinos: Iowa, Indiana, and Missouri.  The model includes controls for seasonality, general 
economic conditions, previous policy changes, and weather events.   
Empirical Model and Data 
 
We follow previous literature by capturing the revenue impact of the smoking ban using a 
dummy variable in a regression equation that includes controls for trend, seasonality, and 
economic activity.  We also include controls for specific exogenous factors, including changes in 
public policy as well as exceptional weather events.  Specifically, the regression model takes the 
general form: 
 
log( ) ( ) ( ) t t tt y c Trend t Seas t X Smokefree u βγ = + + ++ +      (1) 
 
where yt represents either adjusted gross revenue or admissions.  Trend(t) and Seas(t) represent 
general trend and seasonal components, and β is a vector of coefficients associated with a matrix 
of variables (Xt) that measures overall economic activity, policy changes, and other exogenous 
events.  The impact of the smoking ban is estimated by γ, the coefficient on a dummy variable 
that takes on the value of one since the implementation of the Illinois smoking ban (beginning in 




Monthly data for adjusted gross receipts (AGR) and total admissions for 1997 through 
2008 were readily available on websites of the government gaming commissions for Illinois and - 8 - 
 
its contiguous states with riverboat gaming:  Iowa, Indiana, and Missouri. Details about the 
compilation of the data are reported in the Appendix. 
Figure 2 shows statewide revenue over the sample period.  Data for Illinois and its 
surrounding states all show an upward trend, with slowing growth that might be associated with 
the maturation of a relatively new industry.
16
Figure 3 presents the data in a way that highlights the unique experience of Illinois 
casinos during 2008.  In the three previous years, casino revenue in all four states grew at rates of 
4 to 6 percent.  During 2008, revenue in the states surrounding Illinois continued to expand 
(albeit at lower rates in Indiana and Iowa).  In Illinois, however, revenue plummeted by nearly 
21 percent.  This drop represents a decline of nearly 25 percent relative to trend. 
  Each of the series also displays a pronounced 
seasonal pattern.  The data for Illinois also appears to include structural breaks that can be 
associated with specific policy changes enacted by the state legislature (detailed below).  Most 
prominent among these breaks is the sharp fall in revenue in 2008, coinciding with the 
implementation of the Illinois smoking ban.  Although a nationwide recession began at the same 
time—and might be expected to depress gaming revenue—the downturn in Illinois represents a 
clear departure from the experiences of its surrounding states. 
The significance of this difference between the experience of Illinois and its neighbors is 
explored first in regressions for statewide totals.  For this exercise, explanatory variables in the X 
matrix include CEAIit, state-level indexes of coincident economic activity for each of the four 
states (from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia); Snowit, a measure of monthly snowfall in 
                                                 
16 Mandel et al. (2005) and Pakko (2006, 2008a) cite this factor as an explanation for a significant quadratic trend in 
the revenues of gaming venues in Delaware.  For the four states considered here, riverboat gaming was established 
in the early to mid 1990s. - 9 - 
 
each state; and dummy variables specifying particular policy changes or exogenous events.
 17  
Two specific policy changes for the Illinois casino are represented by Jul99, the date when 
continuous riverboat boarding took effect, and Jul03, the date of a significant increase in the tax 
rate imposed on admissions and wagering.
 18,19  Because we have an interest in evaluating 
spillovers from Illinois policy changes on gaming in surrounding states, these two dummy 
variables are also included in the regressions for Indiana, Iowa and Missouri.  Additional dummy 
variables are relevant for the other states:  Aug02 is the date on which Indiana casinos began 
continuous boarding, Apr-May2001 is a dummy variable for a period during which Iowa casinos 
on the Mississippi river were closed due to flooding, and Sep-Nov99 controls for the phased-in 
adoption of continuous boarding in Missouri.
20
 
  The regressions each include a constant, a trend, 
and a trend-squared term.  To account for seasonality, a full array of seasonal dummies is also 
included in each regression (coefficients not reported).  The residuals of the regressions are 
modeled to include an AR(1) term.  Standard errors for all regressions are calculated using the 
heteroskedasticity/autocorrelation adjustment procedure of Newey and West (1987). 
Empirical Results:  State-Level Analysis 
The results for statewide totals of AGR are shown in Table 2.  The regressions achieve a 
reasonable fit to the data, with each of the state-specific policy variables displaying a statistically 
                                                 
17 Monthly snowfall totals were obtained from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA).  The data are measured in inches, represented as deviations from “normal” (1971-2000 averages).  For 
the four states, snowfall data were collected for a representative centrally located city:  Illinois-Urbana, Indiana-
Indianapolis, Missouri-Columbia, and Iowa-Quad Cities (Moline, IL). 
18 Prior to July 1999, riverboats took excursions that limited admittance to specific cruise departure times.  After that 
date, the boats were allowed to remain permanently docked, with continuous open boarding. 
19 Although the tax changes did not affect customers directly, the response of casino operators was to cut back on 
expenses and to lower win-ratios.  The effect of these responses had a demonstrable effect on both attendance and 
revenues.  See Mellen (2003). 
20 Continuous boarding was allowed for St. Louis area riverboats in September 1999, with the policy extended 
across the rest of the state in November.  To account for this phase-in, the variable SepNov99 takes a value of 0.5 for 
September and October and a value of 1.0 thereafter. - 10 - 
 
significant impact (although there is no evident impact of Illinois policy variables on the revenue 
of other states). The key variable of interest—the dummy variable representing the Illinois 
smoking ban—enters with a statistically significant coefficient of -0.25, representing a 
percentage loss of approximately 22 percent.
21
Results for regressions using the natural logarithm of total admissions as the dependent 
variable are reported in Table 3.  The coefficient on the smoking ban dummy variable for Illinois 
is negative and statistically significant, although the magnitude of the decline is considerably 
smaller than found for AGR.  For admissions, the smoking ban dummy is associated with mixed 
changes in the other states; however, the point estimates are small and not statistically 
significant.
  Coefficients on the smoking ban dummy variable 
for revenue in surrounding states are all positive.  However, the point estimates are small and not 
statistically significant.  Hence, there is no clear evidence that the losses at Illinois casinos are 
associated with revenue increases in nearby states.   
22
The statistically significant declines in statewide admissions and revenue in Illinois 
suggest that the smoking ban affected demand for casino gaming along both extensive and 
intensive margins.  These findings are consistent with the survey results of Petry and Oncken 
(2002), which suggests that smoking patrons visit casinos more often and wager more money.  
The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that smoking patrons continued to visit the casinos, but 
perhaps did not visit as often, stay as long, or wager as much as they did before the ban.  To 
further investigate this proposition, and to evaluate more carefully the possibility of demand 
 
                                                 
21  The  conversion  of  regression  coefficients  to  percentage  changes  uses  the  formula  exp(γ)-1  (Halvorsen and 
Palmquist, 1980). 
22 In these and subsequent regressions, the coefficient on the open boarding policy change of July 2003 is a large, 
negative, and statistically significant.  This is an artifact of the counting of admissions.  Before open boarding, 
patrons who stayed for more than one “cruise” were double counted.  This practice ended with open boarding. - 11 - 
 
spillovers into neighboring states, we now turn to an analysis of data for individual casinos in the 
context of geographically defined markets. 
Empirical Results: Individual Casinos in Illinois 
  Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates for the Smokefree dummy variable in 
regressions for each of the nine individual casinos in Illinois.
23  For the sake of brevity in 
presentation here, the full regressions results for each casino are reported in a separate online 
Appendix.
24  All regressions include the policy variables for July 1999 and July 2003, along with 
a number of casino-specific events, described in the paper’s Appendix.
25
The first column of Table 4 shows the results for revenue (AGR).  The impact of the 
smoking ban on Chicago area AGR is remarkably uniform, with each showing losses of over 20 
percent.  For casinos outside the Chicago area, the revenue losses range from less than 10 percent 
to nearly 30 percent.  In every case, however, the coefficients from the AGR regressions are 
negative and statistically significant.   
   
  The second column of Table 4 reports the findings when total admissions is used as the 
dependent variable.  A comparison of these estimates with those found for revenue highlights the 
importance of extensive versus intensive changes in demand.  In some cases, admissions 
declined by magnitudes similar to the fall in revenue (e.g., the Empress casino in Joliet).  In other 
                                                 
23 The casino in Rock Island opened a new, expanded facility in December 2008, resulting in a one-month surge in 
attendance and revenues at the end of the sample period.  To account for this event, regressions for Rock Island (and 
other casinos in the Quad Cities market) were estimated using data through November 2008 only. 
24 See http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/garrett/2009-027appendix.pdf. 
25 For example, the two casinos in Joliet engaged in major renovations or built new facilities in October 2001 
(Harrah’s) and May 2003 (Empress).  The Hollywood casino in Aurora opened new facilities in February and June 
of 2002.  Renovations and new facilities were also relevant for the Par-A-Dice in Peoria (Sept. 2005 and March 
2007) and the Casino Queen in East St. Louis (August 2007).  For the casino in Metropolis, Illinois, river conditions 
created transitory disturbances to business, which we modeled with pulse dummy variables.  All regressions for the 
individual casinos include the Coincident Economic Activity Index for Illinois.  Snowfall variables are as follows:  
For Chicago area casinos, the snowfall at Chicago’s Midway Airport is used; regressions for the casinos in East 
Peoria and Metropolis use snowfall totals for Urbana, Illinois.  For the Rock Island casino, snowfall for Moline, 
Illinois, is used.  For the Alton Belle and Casino Queen, the snowfall for St. Louis, Missouri, is used. 
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cases, declines in attendance were quite smaller than the corresponding declines in AGR.  In the 
majority of cases, attendance figures were significantly lower after the imposition of the smoking 
ban, but the magnitude of the declines were smaller than the declines in revenue  This 
observation supports the results reported for the state-level regressions shown in Tables 2 and 3.  
Before examining regional markets more closely, it is worth noting that the one casino 
that seems least affected by the smoking ban is the one that faces the least competition - the Par-
A-Dice casino in Peoria.  Its location in the center of the state sets it approximately 90 miles 
from the nearest competition.
26
Empirical Results: Regional Casino Markets 
  This is clearly one factor that could account for the relatively 
good performance of that particular venue. 
  It is possible that factors in each of the four geographic market areas of the state are 
relevant for the assessment of the smoking ban’s impact on Illinois casinos.  After all, we are 
limited to measuring the effects of the smoking ban solely by the timing of its imposition.  It 
might still be the case that the 2008 recession had an impact on casino attendance and revenue 
that was not completely captured by the regression analysis of Illinois casinos alone.  A 
comparison of the Illinois casinos with those in common markets but across state lines provides 
some insight in this possibility. 
Chicago Market 
  The largest casino market is the Chicago area market.  In addition to the four casinos in 
Illinois, there are four casino locations in northwest Indiana that are part of the greater Chicago 
                                                 




  In contrast to the AGR results for Illinois casino revenue, for which the coefficients on 
the smoking ban dummy variable were all negative and significant, no clear pattern emerges for 
the Indiana casinos.  There is only one case (the Blue Chip casino) for which the smoking ban 
dummy is associated with a significant negative effect, and this might be associated with the 
impact of the competing casino in Michigan that opened only 5 months before the Illinois 
smoking ban was implemented.  Similarly, there is no clear pattern of changes in admissions at 
Indiana casinos after January 2008.  Again, with the exception of the Blue Chip casino, 
coefficients on the smoking ban dummy variable are very small and not statistically significant.
  Table 5 reports regression coefficients on the smokefree variable for AGR 
and total attendance for these locations.   
28
The clear differences between the Indiana casinos and the Illinois casinos in the Chicago 
area market are summarized in the last two rows of Table 5.  The four casinos in Illinois show a 
revenue decline of approximately 20 percent after the smoking ban implementation, whereas the 
Indiana casinos show no significant decline in revenues as a result of the Illinois smoking ban.  
Admissions figures show a decline of about 13 percent in Illinois, compared to a decline of 3 
percent at the Indiana casinos. 
 
                                                 
27 The Majestic Star casinos in Gary Indiana are two separate gaming floors that share a common admission gate.  
For the purposes of this analysis, the revenues of these two casinos are combined. 
 
28 The full regression results – reported in the Appendix – include the July 1999 and July 2003 dates in order to 
evaluate the prevalence of cross-border spillovers from policy changes in Illinois. There is little evidence of such 
spillover effects from these events, suggesting that it is not surprising for the smoking ban to show no significant, 
measurable effects on the nearby Indiana casinos.  The regressions summarized in Table 5 also include a dummy 
variable for August 2007, the opening date for a new tribal casino in Michigan, only 10 miles north of the Blue Chip 
in Michigan City, Indiana.  The impact of this event on the revenues and admissions are large and significant for the 
Blue Chip casino itself, but are not evident for other casinos in the market.   The regressions for casinos in northwest 
Indiana all use the CEAI for Illinois and snowfall totals for Chicago (Midway).  The regressions for Indiana casinos 
also include two Indiana-specific events:  In August 2002 the Indiana Gaming Commission allowed continuous 
boarding.  In two cases, major renovations were also associated with increased admissions and revenues: in August 
2008 for the Horseshoe casino in Hammond and in February 2006 for the Blue Chip casino in Michigan City. 
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Southern Illinois Market 
 
  The Harrah’s casino in Metropolis Illinois faces nearby competitors in two states:  Casino 
Aztar in Evansville, Indiana, and the Lady Luck in Caruthersville, Missouri.  Of all the nine 
Illinois casinos, the Metropolis casino shows the largest losses in Table 4.  The coefficients on 
the smokefree dummy variable for Metropolis are reproduced in the first row of Table 6 for 
comparison with results for the Evansville and Caruthersville casinos. 
  In Table 6, the dummy variable for the Illinois smoking ban is associated with negative 
responses at each of the non-Illinois casinos, for both AGR and admissions.  In the case of 
Caruthersville, both declines are statistically significant.  These findings suggest that the 
regression model might not be capturing the effect of an overall slowdown in local market 
conditions, with the smoking ban dummy variable picking up some of that effect.  Indeed, in the 
final row of Table 6, regressions for the sum of the two non-Illinois casinos display declines.  In 
the case of the admissions regression, the downturn is clearly significant. If the dummy variable 
is overstating the revenue impact of the smoking ban for the Metropolis casino by over 6 percent, 
and overstating the impact on admissions by over 10 percent, that still leaves a relative decline of 
over 20 percent for AGR and about 8 percent for admissions—broadly consistent with the results 
for the Chicago market. 
Quad Cities Market 
  In the northwest corner of Illinois, Jumer’s Casino in Rock Island faces an array of 
competitors across the Mississippi river in Iowa.  Table 7 compares the experience of Rock 
Island with its four nearest competitors. 
  The first row of Table 7 shows the coefficient estimates for Rock Island, which suggest 
losses of about 10 percent for revenue (statistically significant) and 5 percent for admissions (not - 15 - 
 
significant).  In terms of revenue impact, estimates for the four casinos across the river in Iowa 
stand in sharp contrast:  The smoking ban dummy variable picks up revenue increases of nearly 
23 percent for Catfish Bend and 12 percent for Isle of Capri in Bettendorf.   For the four Iowa 
casinos combined, the regression model shows a significant increase of nearly 15 percent.  In the 
same sense that estimates from out-of-state casinos in the southern Illinois market might indicate 
smaller revenue impacts than directly measured by the Smokefree variable in the Metropolis 
regression, the estimates for the Iowa market show that the Rock Island casinos lagged its 
competitors by more than the smoking ban dummy variable would suggest.  A 10 percent decline 
in Rock Island revenue compared with a 14 percent increase in Iowa casino revenue overall 
places the relative performance for Rock Island roughly 24 percent below its Iowa competitors. 
For the regressions using total admissions, two of the four Iowa casinos show statistically 
significant effects associated with the smoking ban dummy variable.  Despite the large increase 
in revenue at Catfish Bend, admissions were down by about 7 percent.  In contrast, admissions at 
the casino in Bettendorf show a statistically significant increase of 6 percent associated with the 
smoking ban.  For the regression using admission totals for the four Iowa casinos combined, the 
coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. 
St. Louis Market 
The final market to consider is the St. Louis area market.  This market includes two 
casinos on the Illinois side of the Mississippi river: the Argosy in Alton and the Casino Queen in 
East St. Louis.  The regressions in Table 4 show that these two venues experienced losses of over 
25 percent in revenue and between 15 and 20 percent declines in attendance.  However, the 
situation in the St. Louis market is complicated by the opening of a new casino and hotel in St. 
Louis city, the Lumiere Place Casino, which opened in mid-December 2007.  The timing of its - 16 - 
 
opening – coinciding so closely to the implementation of the Illinois smoking ban – makes it 
nearly impossible to disentangle the effects with certainty.  Nevertheless, careful analysis can 
yield some findings that are at least suggestive. 
  Table 8 presents results for the three other casinos on the Missouri side of the border, 
without taking any explicit account of the opening of Lumiere Place.   Two of the three show 
statistically significant declines in revenue:  Ameristar Casino in St. Charles registered a decline 
of nearly 12 percent, and the President Casino (located less than a mile from the new casino) 
shows a revenue loss of nearly 20 percent associated with the smoking ban.  On the other hand, 
the regression for Harrah’s in Maryland Heights shows a small, positive point-estimate for the 
smoking ban dummy (although it is not statistically significant).  The fourth and fifth rows in 
Table 8 compare the sums of the three Missouri casinos’ revenue and attendance figures with 
those using the sum of the two Illinois casinos.  The Missouri total shows a revenue decline of 
about 10 percent, with the two Illinois casinos showing a loss of more than 26 percent.  For 
admissions, the Illinois casinos were down by over 16 percent, as compared with less than 8 
percent for the three Missouri casinos. 
  The final two rows of Table 8 indicate the impact that Lumiere Place had on revenue and 
admissions for the St. Louis market as a whole. Not including Lumiere’s revenue, AGR in the St. 
Louis market was down by 14 percent as a result of the smoking ban.  When Lumiere’s revenue 
is included, the coefficient on the smoking ban dummy is slightly positive but not significant.  
For admissions, a negative coefficient for the total without including Lumiere is significant, but 
when Lumiere’s attendance is added to the total, the coefficient is positive and significant.  We 
can conclude that overall, casino revenue in the St. Louis market was consistent with no unusual - 17 - 
 
aggregate changes in revenue in 2008, but with an increase in overall casino attendance that is 
likely associated with the novelty of a new casino. 
  If we assume (somewhat simplistically) that the opening of Lumiere Place had the same 
impact on all other casinos in the market, the relatively poorer performance of the Illinois casinos 
still leaves room for the conclusion of a significant impact of the smoking ban.  However, it is 
unlikely that the opening of a new competitor affected all other casinos in the market identically.  
Indeed, evidence from the Chicago market suggests that geographic proximity is an important 
determinant of competitive impact. 
The results in Table 8 are consistent with that hypothesis as well.  The President casino in 
downtown St. Louis – less than 0.5 miles from the new casino – showed large losses in 2008 for 
both revenue and admissions.  On the other hand, evidence for effects on the other two casinos in 
Missouri is mixed:  These casinos are both about 21.5 miles from the new Lumiere Place.  We 
might expect, therefore, that the Casino Queen in East St. Louis – about 1.7 miles driving 
distance from Lumiere Place – lost more business to its new competitor than did the casino in 
Alton, Illinois (which is, coincidentally, about 21.5 miles from Lumiere Place). 
A comparison of Missouri and Illinois totals in Table 8 provides some indication of the 
magnitude of the smoking ban’s effect relative to the effect of new competition in the market.  
The 2008 dummy variable is associated with revenue declines at the three Missouri casinos of 
only 10 percent, compared with 26 percent for the two Illinois casinos.  For admissions, the 
comparison is -16 percent for the Illinois casinos versus -8 percent for the Missouri casinos.  
Despite the difficulty of estimating specific values for the effect of the smoking ban on 
each of the two Illinois casinos in the St. Louis market, the results of this exercise are generally 
consistent with the findings from other markets:  The smoking ban was associated with - 18 - 
 
significant revenue declines and smaller but still significant declines in admissions at Illinois 
casinos.  For the St. Louis market, it may be difficult to be precise about the magnitudes, but the 
evidence is qualitatively consistent with outcomes in other markets around the state. 
Interpreting the Regional Market Estimates 
The exercise of estimating the impact of the Illinois smoke-free law on individual casinos 
and comparing those estimates with the experience of nearby out-of-state competitors can be 
interpreted as a robustness check on our results for total statewide revenue and attendance.  To 
the extent that local economic conditions or other exogenous factors affect our measurement of 
the smoking ban’s effect, some adjustment to our raw estimates might be in order. 
Table 9 summarizes our estimates for the smoking ban’s impact on AGR and attendance 
figures: first, in terms of the unadjusted estimated coefficients on the smokefree dummy variable 
and second with an adjustment for the estimates found for out-of-state casinos in the relevant 
geographic market.  That is, we calculate the market-adjusted effect by taking the difference 
between the estimated coefficient for each individual casino and the coefficient found for the 
out-of-state casinos in the same market.  So, for example, the adjusted coefficient for Harrah’s in 
Metropolis (from Table 6) is -0.3344 - (-0.0666) = -0.2678, or -23.5 percent.  This “difference in 
differences” calculation provides an alternative set of estimates for the statewide impact of the 
smoking ban.
29
The results for the Chicago-area market are the most straightforward to interpret.  Each of 
the four Illinois casinos in the Chicago area suffered revenue losses of more than 20 percent.  
The corresponding estimates for competing casinos in Indiana show only small changes that are 
not generally significant.  Similarly, our estimates of the smoking ban’s impact on total 
 
                                                 
29 The specific coefficients used for these comparisons are those reported in Table 5, line 5 (Chicago); Table 6, line 
4 (Southern Illinois); Table 7, line 6 (Quad Cities); and Table 8, line 4 (St. Louis). - 19 - 
 
attendance at Chicago area casinos shows a downturn of more than 13 percent, while the 
coefficient estimates for Indiana casinos in that market shows a downturn of only 3 percent.  In 
terms of relative performance, total attendance at the Illinois casinos was down 9 percent 
compared with out-of-state competitors.   
In the southern Illinois market, we found downturns in both revenue and attendance that 
were among the largest in the state.  However, we also found that the smokefree dummy variable 
picked up negative effects for casinos in Indiana and Missouri as well.  This suggests the 
possibility that there is some additional factor missing from the analysis or that our regression 
specification is not fully accounting for the impact of the economic downturn on casinos in this 
market.  Specifically, our estimates show revenue at the Metropolis casino was down by 28 
percent while revenue at out-of-state casinos was down by 6 percent.  Hence, in terms of relative 
performance, we might temper our estimate of revenue losses to be about 22 percent.  A similar 
comparison for admissions indicates that the 19 percent loss at the Illinois casino, considered 
alongside a 10 percent decline in attendance at out-of-state casinos, yields a measure of relative 
performance of approximately -9 percent. 
In the Iowa market, we found significant positive effects associated with the smokefree 
dummy variable.  This might indicate that the casinos on the Iowa side of the river benefited 
from the patronage of customers who chose not to attend the casino in Rock Island after the 
smoking ban; or it might indicate that there was a general upturn in demand within this particular 
market, but that the Rock Island casino did not share in the increase.  Whatever the 
interpretation, the revenue decline of over 10 percent in Illinois contrasts with a revenue increase 
of more than 14 percent in Iowa, yielding a measure of relative performance amounting to -25 
percent.  In this market, coefficient estimates for the admissions regressions were not generally - 20 - 
 
significant, but a comparison of coefficient point estimates yields a measure of relative 
performance equal to nearly -8 percent. 
Finally, in the St. Louis market, one factor influencing revenue that is difficult to 
disentangle from the smoking ban is the opening of a new casino in downtown St. Louis.  This 
factor most certainly has an impact on the magnitude of our coefficient estimates.  As a whole, 
the three pre-existing casinos on the Missouri side of the river suffered revenue declines of about 
10 percent after January 2008, compared with declines of over 26 percent in the Illinois casinos 
in this market.  The difference-in-differences effect is about -16 percent.   For total admissions, 
the Illinois casinos were down 16 percent and the three Missouri casinos were down by over 7 
percent, leaving a relative difference of nearly -9 percent. 
When the coefficients for Illinois casinos are adjusted for market conditions measured for 
nearby out-of-state competitors, the results become more uniform across the state.  In terms of 
relative performance, revenue was down by approximately 20 percent and total admissions were 
down by about 10 percent.  These estimates are consistent with the results in Tables 2 and 3 for 
statewide totals.  In fact, summing over the results for each of the nine casinos provides 
alternative estimates that are quite close to the results reported in Table 2 and 3 (22.1 percent for 
revenue and 12.3 for admissions).  For the unadjusted coefficients, total revenue losses come to 
21.8 percent with attendance declines of 13 percent.  With the difference-in-differences 
adjustment for market conditions, revenue is calculated to have fallen by 20.4 percent, with 
admissions down 9.1 percent.  These lower figures are primarily attributable to adjustments 
made to account for local economic conditions in the Southern Illinois market and the St. Louis 
market.  
 - 21 - 
 
Impact on Casino Tax Revenue 
  Given the estimates reported above, the evidence suggests that the Illinois smoking ban 
has been associated with declining attendance and falling revenue at Illinois riverboat casinos.  
For policymakers, a key question that arises from this analysis involves the impact on tax 
revenue.   
The state of Illinois imposes both a per capita admission tax and a proportionate wagering 
tax on riverboat casinos.  The admissions tax is set at $3 per person for patrons of Casino Rock 
Island and $2 per person for the other eight casinos.  From each admission, $1 goes to the host 
community where a riverboat gaming operation is located and the remainder goes to the state.  
The wagering tax is set on a graduated scale, as a percent of AGR.  The tax rates are 
reported in Table 10.
30
Using our estimated effects on revenue and admissions at the Illinois casinos, Tables 11A 
and 11B show the casino tax revenue impact of the smoking ban for both state and local 
governments.  In Table 11A, using the unadjusted estimated coefficients reported in Table 4, we 
find total tax revenue declines of $208 million.  Of this total, the state lost $195.5 million, while 
local communities collectively suffered revenue losses of $12.4 million.  Table 11B uses the 
market-adjusted coefficients.  Tax revenue losses are slightly smaller using this calculation: 
Total revenues were down by $194.8 million, with the state’s share of that loss $183.7 million 
and the local communities’ share equal to approximately $11.1 million.
   Each local government that serves as a host community for a casino 
licensee receives a share in an amount equal to 5 percent of AGR, with the remainder of the 
progressive tax revenue going to the state.  
31
                                                 
30 The present tax structure has been in effect since July 1, 2005 (Illinois Gaming Board, Annual Report, 2008).  
 
31 These figures represent only the loss in gaming tax revenue and admissions tax revenue.  Total tax revenue losses 
to the state and local governments may be less if consumers substitute away from casino gambling into other taxable 
activities. - 22 - 
 
Summary and Conclusions   
  A growing number of state and local government have passed laws that ban smoking in 
public places, including casinos.  Prohibiting smoking in casinos – if such smoking bans reduce 
casino revenue - serves as an opposing public policy to the legalization of casino gaming as a 
mean of generating revenue.  These opposing policies, along with health-related aspects of 
smoking, are the primary points of debate in policy discussions regarding smoking bans and, as a 
result, have attracted the attention of researchers interested in estimating the potential revenue 
effects of smoking bans.   
  Our work extends and improves upon previous studies that have explored the revenue 
effects of smoking bans in two key ways.  First, we consider the effect of the smoking ban on 
both revenue and attendance to provide new insight into the intensity of wagering and casino 
patronage after the smoking ban.  Second, and more importantly, we conduct a natural 
experiment by comparing the performance of casinos in a smoking-ban state with out-of-state 
casinos with no smoking ban that all share a common casino market.  This natural experiment 
provides for a more effective test of the impact of smoking bans than simply analyzing casinos 
directly impacted by the smoking ban and, we argue, should be considered in future research on 
the economic effects of smoking bans. 
  Our results indicate that Illinois casinos suffered losses of more than 20 percent – well 
over $400 million – in total during the first year of the Smoke Free Illinois Act.  Some of this 
loss appears to be associated with casino patrons gambling less when they do attend the casinos, 
and part of the loss is also evident in declining attendance.  We find that the impact of the 
smoking ban on total admissions amounts to around 10 percent, with our point estimates 
indicating a downturn in the range of 9 to 13 percent.  These estimates imply total casino tax 
revenue was lower by roughly $200 million. - 23 - 
 
The economic effects of the Smoke Free Illinois Act—specifically with regard to casino 
revenue and government tax receipts—represent only part of the Act’s overall impact.  In a full 
analysis, these effects need to be considered alongside costs and benefits, including the public 
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The sample period for the analysis runs from January 1997 through December 2008. Monthly data for adjusted gross 
receipts (AGR) and total admissions were obtained from information on the websites of the various state gaming 
commissions, as detailed below: 
 
Illinois:  Data for 1997 through 2008 were available in Annual Reports of the Illinois Gaming Board: 
http://www.igb.state.il.us/annualreport/.   
 
Indiana:  Data for total admissions and AGR were obtained from monthly reports of the Indiana Gaming 
Commission: http://www.in.gov/igc/2363.htm.  AGR has been reported directly since July 2003.  For July 
2002 through June 2003, total revenue is measured as the sum of revenues reported for table games and slot 
machines.  Prior to July 2002 revenues were calculated by multiplying the total wagering tax by 5.0. (Until 
July 2002, Indiana imposed a fixed 20% tax on adjusted gross revenues). 
 
Iowa:  Revenue and admissions data were obtained from monthly reports of the Iowa Racing and Gaming 
Commission: http://www.state.ia.us/irgc/. 
 





•  Indexes of coincident economic activity for Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri were obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
 
•  Monthly snowfall totals, along with measures of “normal” snowfall, were collected from various webpages 
associated with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
 
•  Dummy variables representing one-time intercept shifts as well as “pulse” dummies for transitory events 
are defined in Table A1. 
 
 
 Description of Dummy Variables 
 
Intercept Shift Dummies 
 
SMOKEFREE:  Illinois smoking ban.  Value=1 for 2008:01 through 2008:12 and zero otherwise. 
 
July 99:  Beginning of open boarding for Illinois casinos. 
 
Aug 02:  Beginning of open boarding for Indiana casinos. 
 
July 03:  Tax increase for Illinois casinos, reportedly associated with policy changes (supply shift). 
 
July 03:  Indiana casinos get approval to stay open 24 hours per day. 
 
Sep-Nov 99:  Beginning of open boarding for Missouri casinos.  St. Louis area casinos began open boarding in 
September, with the rest of the state following in November.  Dummy variable coded as having a value of 0.5 for 
1999:09 and 1999:10, 1.0 for 1999:11 and all subsequent periods (zero otherwise). 
 
May03:  Empress – Joliet, new barge completed. - 27 - 
 
Oct 01:  Harrah’s – Joliet, riverboats replaced with floating barges. 
 
Feb 02:  Hollywood – Aurora opens new dockside casino. 
 
Jun 02:  Hollywood – Aurora opens phase two of dockside casino. 
 
Sep 05:  Par-A-Dice – Peoria renovation completed August 23. 
 
Sep 01:  Harrah’s – Metropolis opens new riverboat. 
 
Aug 07:  Casino Queen – E. St. Louis opens new land-based casino. 
 
Aug 07:  New casino in SW Michigan opens, competition for casinos in the Chicago market (esp. those in Indiana). 
 
Aug 08:  Horseshoe – Hammond opens new riverboat. 
 
Feb 06:  Blue Chip – Michigan City opens new riverboat. 
 
Mar 07:  In Evansville, Indiana, new casino owners announce layoffs, leading to a public dispute with the mayor. 
 
Jun 07:  Catfish Bend opens new land-based casino.  Isle of Capri in Bettendorf, Iowa, opens new hotel tower. 
 
Nov 07:  Catfish Bend closes old riverboat casino. 
 





Apr-May 2001:  Flooding on the Mississippi River closes some of the Iowa casinos. 
 
Jan 2005:   Low water forces Metropolis casino to close for several days. 
 
Aug 2005:  Flooding forces Metropolis casino to close for several days. 
 
Apr 2008:  Flooding closes Iowa casinos along the Mississippi. 
 
Jun 2008:  Flooding closes Rhythm City Casino in Davenport, Iowa. 
 
Apr 1998:  Barges collide with the President casino, forcing its closing. 
 
May 2002: Flooding forces the closing of the President casino for several days. 
 
Apr 2008:  Flooding forces the closing of the President casino for several days. 
 
Jun 2008:  Flooding forces the closing of the President casino for several days. 
 
Jul 2008:   Flooding forces the closing of the President casino for several days. 
 
Sep 2008:  Flooding forces the closing of the President casino for several days 
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Table 1:  
 Illinois Riverboat Casinos 2008 
 







Admissions  2008 AGR 
Alton  Argosy  Oct. 1991  23,000  1,182,856  $90,689,307 
Peoria  Par-A-Dice  Feb. 1992  26,116  1,350,245  $116,726,216 
Rock Island  Jumer’s  May 1992  42,000  668,993  $34,282,665 
Joliet  Empress  Jul. 1992  50,000  1,678,360  $183,930,419 
Metropolis  Harrah’s  Feb. 1993  30,985  1,076,085  $126,501,001 
Joliet  Harrah’s  Aug. 1993  39,000  2,570,878  $297,674,723 
Aurora  Hollywood  Jul. 1993  41,384  1,627,759  $220,000,676 
East St. Louis  Casino Queen  Jul. 1993  40,000  2,296,919  $160,194,391 
Elgin  Grand Victoria  Oct. 1994  29,850  2,184,959  $338,727,854 
           
 
Source:  Illinois Gaming Board, 2008 Annual Report.  AGR is adjusted gross revenue, defined as player 
wagers less winnings.   - 32 - 
 
        Table 2: State-Level Regressions for Adjusted Gross Receipts (AGR) 
 
                             
    Illinois  Indiana  Iowa  Missouri   
                  [ -22.1%]   [    0.0%]   [   2.2%]   [   1.9%]    
  SMOKEFREE
†  -0.2503 ***  0.0001   0.0215   0.0189    
    (0.0258)   (0.0642)   (0.0309)   (0.0172)    
                        Constant  14.5001 ***  11.5890 ***  13.8715 ***  20.0078 ***   
    (1.0418)   (2.6638)   (1.2486)   (0.8550)    
                        Trend  0.6239 ***  1.1901 ***  0.4625 ***  1.1288 ***   
    (0.1116)   (0.1843)   (0.1057)   (0.0704)    
                        Squared Trend  -0.1860 **  -0.4852 ***  -0.0294   -0.4361 ***   
    (0.0737)   (0.1166)   (0.0594)   (0.0343)    
                        CEAI  0.7566 ***  1.3712 **  0.7257 ***  -0.4442 **   
    (0.2108)   (0.5487)   (0.2582)   (0.1776)    
                        Snow  -0.0049 ***  -0.0046 ***  -0.0038 ***  -0.0023    
    (0.0010)   (0.0010)   (0.0006)   (0.0019)    
                        July 99  0.2080 ***  -0.0008   0.0377   -0.0019    
    (0.0297)   (0.0417)   (0.0257)   (0.0148)    
                        July 03  -0.1263 ***  -0.0608 **  -0.0233   0.0114    
    (0.0180)   (0.0261)   (0.0219)   (0.0181)    
                        Aug 02      0.0922 ***           
        (0.0352)            
                        Apr-May 2001          -0.0972 ***       
            (0.0144)        
                        Sep-Nov 99              0.0446 **   
                (0.0196)    
                        AR(1)  0.4548 ***  0.6364 ***  0.4262 ***  0.0863    
    (0.1028)   (0.0927)   (0.1088)   (0.0943)    
                                              Adj R-Squared  0.9787   0.9801   0.9703   0.9837    
                 
     Note:  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
       †Figures in brackets [ ] are percentage changes associated with SMOKEFREE. 
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Table 3: State-Level Regressions for Total Admissions 
 
                             
    Illinois  Indiana  Iowa  Missouri   
                  [ -12.3%]   [ - 5.1%]   [ - 3.0%]   [   3.8%]    
  SMOKEFREE
†  -0.1309 ***  -0.0521   -0.0303   0.0370    
    (0.0263)   (0.0319)   (0.0422)   (0.0275)    
                        Constant  11.7670 ***  7.4486 ***  8.6545 ***  15.6725 ***   
    (0.7558)   (2.7001)   (1.8473)   (1.2109)    
                        Trend  -0.2120 ***  0.5652 ***  -0.4491 ***  0.3729 ***   
    (0.0584)   (0.2080)   (0.1615)   (0.1119)    
                        Trend Squared  0.1374 ***  -0.3214 ***  0.3466 ***  -0.2243 ***   
    (0.0426)   (0.1054)   (0.0858)   (0.0555)    
                        CEAI  0.5603 ***  1.4840 ***  1.0655 ***  -0.1468    
    (0.1557)   (0.5603)   (0.3827)   (0.2519)    
                        Snow  -0.0066 ***  -0.0059 ***  -0.0045 ***  -0.0028    
    (0.0009)   (0.0011)   (0.0006)   (0.0017)    
                        July 99  -0.2713 ***  0.0397   0.0485   0.0717 ***   
    (0.0177)   (0.0396)   (0.0399)   (0.0255)    
                        July 03  -0.1929 ***  -0.0161   -0.0408   0.0623 **   
    (0.0145)   (0.0185)   (0.0271)   (0.0266)    
                        Aug 02      -0.4833 ***           
        (0.0380)            
                        Apr-May 2001          -0.1149 ***       
            (0.0172)        
                        Sep-Nov 99              0.0596 **   
                (0.0273)    
                        AR(1)  0.3860 ***  0.7379 ***  0.5623 ***  0.3997 ***   
    (0.0848)   (0.0695)   (0.0966)   (0.1048)    
                                              Adj R-Squared  0.9776   0.9625   0.8699   0.8987    
                 
    Note:  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
      †Figures in brackets [ ] are percentage changes associated with SMOKEFREE.  
 
Table 4: Regression Results for Individual Illinois Casinos 
  Coefficient Estimate for SMOKEFREE  
[Percent Change]    
  AGR    Admissions   
                [ -9.4%]      [  5.9%]     
     Par-A-Dice, East Peoria  -0.0990 ***    0.0570 ***   
  (0.0143)      (0.0166)     
              Chicago Area             
     Empress, Joliet  [ -21.0%]      [ -22.9%]     
  -0.2360 ***    -0.2598 ***   
  (0.0336)      (0.0574)     
                   Harrah’s, Joliet  [ -21.9%]      [ -16.7%]     
  -0.2471 ***    -0.1830 ***   
  (0.0254)      (0.0583)     
                   Hollywood, Aurora  [ -20.6%]      [ -10.1%]     
  -0.2305 ***    -0.1069 **   
  (0.0525)      (0.0431)     
                   Grand Victoria, Elgin  [ -21.3%]      [ - 2.8%]     
  -0.2395 ***    -0.0282    
  (0.0270)      (0.0230)     
              Southern Illinois             
     Harrah’s, Metropolis  [ -28.4%]      [ -18.8%]     
       -0.3344 ***    -0.2082 ***   
  (0.0267)      (0.0454)     
              Quad Cities             
     Jumer’s, Rock Island  [ -10.6%]      [ - 5.4%]     
       -0.1115 ***    -0.0551    
  (0.0312)      (0.0400)     
              St. Louis             
     Argosy, Alton  [ -25.7%]      [ -14.7%]     
  -0.2969 ***    -0.1590 ***   
  (0.0309)      (0.0389)     
                   Casino Queen, East St. Louis  [ -26.7%]      [ -17.6%]     
  -0.3104 ***    -0.1936 ***   
  (0.0191)      (0.0454)     
                       Note:  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Standard errors  
         are in parentheses.  The full regression results are available at: 
         http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/garrett/2009-027appendix.pdf. 
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Table 5: Regression Results for Casinos in Northwest Indiana 
 
            Coefficient Estimate for SMOKEFREE  
[Percent Change]    
  AGR    Admissions   
                Horseshoe,  Hammond  [ - 1.5%]      [ - 6.9%]     
  -0.0156     -0.0711    
  (0.0401)      (0.0470)     
                Ameristar,  East Chicago  [   2.9%]      [ - 0.5%]     
  0.0288     -0.0049    
  (0.0384)      (0.0481)     
                Majestic Star (I & II),  Gary  [ - 2.0%]      [ - 3.3%]     
  -0.0236     -0.0335    
  (0.0254)      (0.0254)     
                Blue Chip,  Michigan City  [ - 8.8%]      [ -10.6%]     
  -0.0919 **    -0.1123 ***   
  (0.0358)      (0.0312)     
              Indiana Total  [   0.4%]      [ - 3.0%]     
  0.0044     -0.0306 *   
  (0.0193)      (0.0184)     
              Illinois Total  [ -20.2%]      [ -13.1%]     
  -0.2257 ***    -0.1408 ***   
  (0.0170)      (0.0326)     
                       Note:  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Standard errors  
         are in parentheses.  The full regression results are available at: 
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Table 6: Regression Results for the Southern Illinois Market  
 
            Coefficient Estimate for SMOKEFREE  
[Percent Change]    
  AGR    Admissions   
               Harrah’s,  Metropolis (IL)  [ -28.4%]      [ -18.8%]     
  -0.3344 ***    -0.2082 ***   
  (0.0267)      (0.0454)     
               Aztar, Evansville (IN)  [ - 5.0%]      [ - 7.5%]     
  -0.0514     -0.0776 **   
  (0.0400)      (0.0362)     
               Lady Luck, Caruthersville (MO) 
 
[ -11.4%]      [ -16.3%]     
  -0.1205 ***    -0.1779 ***   
  (0.0381)      (0.0426)     
              Non-Illinois Total  [ - 6.4%]      [ -10.5%]     
  -0.0666 *    -0.1104 ***   
  (0.0343)      (0.0342)     
                       Note:  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Standard errors  
         are in parentheses.  The full regression results are available at: 
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Table 7: Regression Results for the Quad City Market 
 
            Coefficient Estimate for SMOKEFREE  
[Percent Change]    
  AGR    Admissions   
                Jumer’s, Rock Island (IL)  [ - 10.6%]      [ - 5.4%]     
  -0.1115 ***    -0.0551    
  (0.0312)      (0.0400)     
                Catfish Bend, Burlington  [  22.6%]      [ - 6.9%]     
  0.2040 ***    -0.0710 **   
  (0.0388)      (0.0345)     
                Rhythm City, Davenport  [   1.9%]      [ - 4.4%]     
  0.0188     -0.0446    
  (0.0533)      (0.0497)     
                Isle of Capri, Bettendorf  [   12.0%]      [   6.3%]     
  0.0193 ***    0.0611 ***   
  (0.0408)      (0.0196)     
                Wild Rose, Clinton  [  - 0.3%]      [ - 2.8%]     
  -0.0028     -0.0286    
  (0.0213)      (0.0218)     
              Iowa (4) Total  [ 14.6%]      [   2.4%]     
  0.1359 ***    0.0240    
  (0.0311)      (0.0308)     
                       Note:  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Standard errors  
         are in parentheses.  The full regression results are available at: 
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Table 8:  Summary of Regression Results for the St. Louis Market 
 
            Coefficient Estimate for SMOKEFREE 
      
    
[Percent Change]    
  AGR    Admissions   
                Harrah’s, Maryland Heights  [   0.7%]      [ - 0.0%]     
  0.0073     -0.0003    
  (0.0580)      (0.0576)     
                Ameristar,  St. Charles  [ -11.9%]      [ - 5.9%]     
  -0.1272 ***    -0.0609 *   
  (0.0413)      (0.0347)     
                President,  St. Louis  [ -19.2%]      [ -19.0%]     
  -0.2131 ***    -0.2111 ***   
  (0.0348)      (0.0670)     
              Missouri Total  [ -10.3%]      [ - 7.7%]     
  -0.1082 ***    -0.0799 ***   
  (0.0303)      (0.0252)     
              Illinois Total  [ -26.2%]      [ -16.4%]     
  -0.3040 ***    -0.1791 ***   
  (0.0210)      (0.0341)     
             
Market Total without Lumiere  [ -13.7%]      [ - 7.7%]     
  -0.1479 ***    -0.0805 ***   
  (0.0211)      (0.0187)     
             
Market Total incl. Lumiere  [   0.5%]     [  13.2%]    
  0.0054      0.1241  ***   
  (0.0180)      (0.0406)     
                         Note:  *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Standard errors  
         are in parentheses.  The full regression results are available at: 






Table 9:  Revenue and Attendance Estimates by Illinois Casino 
                                         
  
  Revenue Estimates    Attendance Estimates    
     Unadjusted Coefficients     Adjusted for Market     Unadjusted Coefficients     Adjusted for Market     
     Percent      Dollars    Percent      Dollars    Percent     Admissions    Percent     Admissions    
  Par-A-Dice – East Peoria  -9.4  -12,133,325   -9.4  -12,133,325    5.9  74,637   5.9  74,637   
   Empress – Joliet  -21.0  -48,513,528   -21.4  -49,307,311    -22.9  -493,720   -20.5  -442,055   
   Harrah’s – Joliet  -21.9  -83,329,697   -22.2  -84,626,219    -16.7  -524,428   -14.1  -443,240   
   Hollywood – Aurora  -20.6  -57,096,219   -20.9  -58,067,362    -10.1  -185,369   -7.3  -134,317   
   Grand Victoria – Elgin  -21.3  -90,787,691   -21.6  -92,261,403    -2.8  -61,871   0.2  5,343   
   Harrah’s – Metropolis  -28.4  -50,141,728   -23.5  -41,445,767    -18.8  -249,807   -9.3  -123,811   
   Jumer’s  –  Rock Island  -10.6  -3,614,480   -21.9  -7,505,450    -5.4  -33,187   -7.6  -47,045   
   Argosy –  Alton   -25.7  -31,333,127   -17.2  -20,978,374    -14.7  -204,238   -7.6  -105,640   
   Casino Queen – E. St. Louis  -26.7  -58,241,949   -18.3  -39,960,631    -17.6  -490,604   -10.7  -299,519   
                            
   Total for Illinois  -21.8  -435,191,745    -20.4  -406,285,841    -13.0  -2,168,587   -9.1  -1,515,648   
                            
  
  Estimates from Statewide 
Regression 
-22.1  -443,669,617          -12.3  -2,045,376         
                                         
Note:  Estimates for unadjusted coefficients are based on the results reported in Table 4.  Estimates for the “relative to market” columns use the differences in the 







Table 10:  Illinois Wagering Tax 2008 
Adjusted Gross Revenue 
(Millions of dollars) 
Tax Rate (Percent) 
0 - 25  15.0 
25 - 50  22.5 
50 - 75  27.5 
75 - 100  32.5 
100 - 150  37.5 
150 - 200  45.0 
>200  50.0 














Gaming Tax Revenue ($) 
Gain (+) or Loss (-) 
 
Admission Tax Revenue ($) 
Gain (+) or Loss (-) 
 
Total Tax Revenue ($) 
Gain (+) or Loss (-) 
  To State  To Local  To State  To Local  To State  To Local 
Par-A-Dice  -4,322,497  -227,500  74,637  74,637  -4,247,860  -152,863 
Empress  -22,199,958  -1,168,419  -493,720  -493,720  -22,693,678  -1,662,139 
Harrah’s  -39,581,606  -2,083,242  -524,428  -524,428  -40,106,034  -2,607,670 
Hollywood  -27,120,704  -1,427,405  -185,369  -185,369  -27,306,073  -1,612,774 
Elgin  -43,124,153  -2,269,692  -61,871  -61,871  -43,186,024  -2,331,563 
Metropolis  -19,744,745  -1,039,197  -249,807  -249,807  -19,994,552  -1,289,004 
Rock Island  -772,595  -40,663  -33,186  -66,373  -805,781  -107,036 
Argosy Alton   -10,718,724  -564,143  -204,238  -204,238  -10,922,962  -768,381 
Casino Queen  -25,766,848  -1,356,150  -490,604  -490,604  -26,257,452  -1,846,754 
Total  -193,351,830  -10,176,412  -2,168,587  -2,201,774  -195,520,416  -12,378,184 
Total by Tax  -203,528,241  -4,370,360  -207,898,600 
 
Note:  Predicted values from Table 4 were used to compute AGR and admissions with and without a smoking ban.  
The AGR tax rates (Table 10) were then used to compute the revenue gain or loss from the smoking ban.  Per 
Illinois law, we allocated 95 percent of the gain or loss in AGR tax revenue to the state and 5 percent to the home 
dock community.  There is a $2 admissions tax, half of which goes to the state and half to the home dock.  The 





















Gaming Tax Revenue ($) 
Gain (+) or Loss (-) 
 
Admission Tax Revenue ($) 
Gain (+) or Loss (-) 
 
Total Tax Revenue ($) 
Gain (+) or Loss (-) 
  To State  To Local  To State  To Local  To State  To Local 
Par-A-Dice  -4,322,497  -227,500  74,637  74,637  -4,247,860  -152,863 
Empress  -22,539,300  -1,186,279  -442,055  -442,055  -22,981,355  -1,628,334 
Harrah’s  -40,197,454  -2,115,655  -443,240  -443,240  -40,640,694  -2,558,895 
Hollywood  -27,581,997  -1,451,684  -134,317  -134,317  -27,716,314  -1,586,001 
Elgin  -43,824,167  -2,306,535  5,343  5,343  -43,818,824  -2,301,192 
Metropolis  -16,646,809  -876,148  -123,811  -123,811  -16,770,620  -999,959 
Rock Island  -1,604,290  -84,436  -47,045  -94,091  -1,651,335  -178,527 
Alton Belle  -7,473,546  -393,345  -105,640  -105,640  -7,579,186  -498,985 
Casino Queen  -17,951,585  -944,820  -299,519  -299,519  -18,251,104  -1,244,339 
Total  -182,141,643  -9,586,402  -1,515,648  -1,562,694  -183,657,292  -11,149,095 
Total by Tax  -191,728,045  -3,078,343  -194,806,387 
 
Note:  Predicted values from Table 4 were used to compute AGR and admissions with and without a smoking ban.  
The predicted values for 2008 where then adjusted using the differences in the smoking ban coefficient for the 
casino and the smoking ban coefficient for each casino’s respective out-of-state market (from Tables 5–8).  The 
AGR tax rates (Table 10) were then used to compute the revenue gain or loss from the smoking ban.  Per Illinois 
law, we allocated 95 percent of the gain or loss in AGR tax revenue to the state and 5 percent to the home dock 
community.  There is a $2 admissions tax, half of which goes to the state and half to the home dock.  The exception 
is Rock Island where there is a $3 admissions tax, with $1 going to the state and $2 to the home dock. 
 
 
 
 
 